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Realists
in international relations and realistic conflict theorists in social psychology argue that the perception of threat in intergroup conflict is a function of power asym metries between groups. In contrast, social constructivists and social identity theorists argue that a shared sense of identity can reduce perceptions of intergroup threat. In this article, we test these competing arguments using three laboratory experiments conducted in two different countries (Spain and the United States). Four findings emerge from the experiments:
(1) a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perception, as realists predict; (2) shared identity decreases threat perception, as constructivists predict; (3) an interactive relationship between power and identity appears in two of the three studies; and (4) shared identity increases cooperation in economic policy areas.
Keywords: identity; power; threats; realism; constructivism; experiments The perception of threat has long been a central topic in both the intergroup conflict and international relations literatures (Jervis 1976; Kemmelmeier and Winter 2000; Rouhana and Fiske 1995) . In this article, we contribute to these lit eratures by presenting the results of three experiments that probe two competing explanations for the emergence of the perception of threat: relative power and shared identity. Proponents of realism in international relations (Grieco 1988; Waltz 1979 ) and realistic conflict theory in psychology (Campbell 1965; Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1966; Sherif and Sherif 1953) predict that asymmetries in power will automatically trigger perceptions of threat and intergroup conflict. In contrast, social constructivists in international relations (Hopf 2002; Wendt 1999 ) and social identity theorists in psychology (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986 ; see also Bar-Tal 1998; Hogg and Abrams 1999) develop and experimentally test a model of identity construction. In this article, we fill this void by developing the "construction of threat model" at the individual level and testing its predictions using three laboratory experiments (one conducted in the United States and two conducted in Spain). Four key findings emerge from the experiments: (1) a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perception, as realists predict; (2) shared identity decreases threat perception, as constructivists predict; (3) an interactive relationship between power and identity appears in two of the three studies; and (4) shared identity increases cooperation in economic policy areas.
In sum, the results strongly support the construction of threat model and demonstrate how both power and identity play a role in threat perception.
The remainder of this article is divided into eight sections. tion of the experimental findings to our understanding of realism and liberalism.
The final section provides a brief conclusion to the study.
Power and Threat Perception
In the international relations literature, a threat is defined as a situation in which one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative con sequence on another agent or group (Davis 2000, 10 Power can be used to threaten (or reward). Dahl (1957) defines power as the ability of actor A to get actor B to do what actor A wants (and that which actor B was not going to do anyway). Dahl's definition focuses on observable conflict between two actors. Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) Power by d?finition is a relative concept; the power of actor A can only be assessed relative to the remaining actors in the environment (Grieco 1990, 40; Fiske 1993; Jones 1972 tional relations in general in zero-sum terms (Waltz 1979, 70, 105 (Waltz 1979, 131 Both classical (e.g., Gulick 1955 ) and structural realists (e.g., Waltz 1979) argue that threats are a function of power asymmetries (Doyle 1997, 168 joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future" (Grieco 1988, 487) . Realistic conflict theory (Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1966 ) is similar to realism in that power (or resource) asymmetries are the root cause of conflict among groups. The theory is realistic in that there is a "real" conflict over material resources. In a series of field studies at a boys' summer camp, Sherif and Sherif (1953) theories were developed to explain prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory beha vior toward members of the out-group. Given that prejudice is often (but not always) associated with a fear that the out-group has the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on the in-group, these theories can provide a com peting explanation for the rise and fall of the perception of threat. SIT (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979) begins with the assumption that indi viduals automatically sort themselves into categories. This is a natural cognitive process that occurs in any social setting. Although the speed of the sorting and sal ience of the categorization can vary (e.g., high salience when you are a very dis tinct minority on a sorting dimension), the placement of objects into categories always occurs and the placement of the "self" in one category immediately creates an "other" (Brewer and Brown 1998 Thus, SIT postulates a multistep process that encompasses both cognitive and moti vational elements.
SCT (Turner et al. 1987 ) emphasizes the cognitive aspect of identity construc tion rather than the motivational aspect. The first step in the process is identical to lars have adopted the logic of SIT to predict that "outsiders" in international affairs will be viewed as more threatening than "insiders" (Wendt 1999 ).
Construction of Threat Theory
We conceptualize collective identities as "bundles" of shared values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and roles that are used to draw a boundary between the "in-group" and the "out-group" (Rousseau 2006, 12) . Although proponents of SIT and SCT routinely discuss movement between identities based on the social context (e.g., shifting a personal identity from "father" to "professor" or shifting a collec tive identity from "Scottish" to "British"), there has been insufficient discussion of the process through which individuals construct identities for the collective in-group and the collective out-group. What building blocks are utilized? How are they aggregated? How can they be manipulated to alter a sense of identity? The construction of threat theory has been developed to answer these questions within the context of international relations (Rousseau 2006 (Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz 1996, 70) . When faced with this situation, individuals compute a response using accessible information. How this is done is still a matter of great controversy. The traditional explanation proposes that individuals simply balance salient consid erations for and against the proposition retrieved from memory (Dawes 1979; Keeney and Raiffa 1976; Zaller 1992 In Figure  1 , we present the hypothetical case of "Jane Doe." Jane tends to use eight different dimensions to evaluate Japan, ranging from wealth to great power status. However, these dimensions are "latent" in that they are in memory but not necessarily immediately available. On any given day, only a subset of the latent dimensions will be "salient" or readily accessible. Only dimensions that are salient influence the construction of the opinion (e.g., influence the aggregation process).
In Figure  1 nese citizens profess adherence to the Shinto religion than to Buddhism, this "objective" fact is irrelevant to the subjective assessment of Jane Doe. If she believes Japan is a Buddhist country, her categorization scheme will reflect this belief. Moreover, the categorization will ultimately influence the degree of per ceived shared identity and her perception of threat (Gries 2005, 237) . How does this conceptualization of identity creation relate to threat perception?
The construction of threat model claims that the perception of threat is a function of the line drawn between the in-group and the out-group. The model predicts that power influences people's threat perceptions only after identity between the self and the other has been established. If the other is completely unlike the self (i.e., if no shared identity exists), the material balance of power between the self and the other will be a good predictor of threat perception. However, the higher the level of shared identity between the self and the other, the less threatening the other will The perception of a highly similar or shared identity will also have important consequences in terms of affect, beliefs, and behaviors (Crisp and Hewstone 2006) . The greater the sense of shared identity, the stronger the affective attachment the individual will have toward the other (see Figure 2 ). In addition, a shared sense of identity will lead individuals to categorize themselves as closer to the other. Thus, shared identity will manifest itself in both "hot" emotional and "cold" cognitive terms. More important, a shared sense of identity will decrease the belief that the other has the intention to inflict negative consequences on the individual. There fore, a shared sense of identity will alter behavior by increasing the willingness of the individual to cooperate with the other. Returning to our example of Jane Doe, if she believes that the United States and Japan share a common identity, she should believe that Japan is less threatening than other states, and she should be more will ing to take a chance on cooperating with Japan because the risks of exploitation are lower. Therefore, by making specific attitudes and beliefs salient, shared identity increases the probability of cooperation.
Experiment #1: Abstract Scenario in the United States Experiment #1 tests whether a perception of threat posed by another country is influenced by the material balance of power and/or a shared sense of identity. The 4-'-Perception Of Weakness
Relative to the Other experiment employed an abstract scenario involving two unnamed countries engaged in a territorial dispute (Geva and Hanson 1999) . Specifically, participants were asked to play the role of a foreign policy advisor in an unnamed country. They were informed that a simmering international dispute had erupted into conflict, and they were asked to advise their boss on the best possible course of action. The sce nario was intentionally vague with respect to the party responsible for the outbreak of fighting. After completing the short scenario, participants answered a series of questions about the source of conflict and the utility of using military force. The experimental survey varied along two dichotomous dimensions: the balance of military forces between the countries (strong vs. weak power) and the degree of shared identity between the countries (shared vs. nonshared identity). Our main experimental hypotheses then focused on the relationship between power, identity, and threat perception. The causal process linking these elements is illustrated in Figure 2 . Specifically, we hypothesized the following:
Hypothesis 1: Power. If the foreign country is framed as a strong military power, then the participant's perception of threat will increase. This hypothesis is derived from the realist school of thought in international relations (Mear sheimer 2001; Waltz 1979 ) and the realistic conflict theory of social psychol ogy (Levine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1966 ).
Hypothesis 2: Identity. If the foreign country is framed as similar to the home country (e.g., similar language, religions, and culture), then the perception of threat will decrease. This hypothesis is derived from the social constructivism school of thought in international relations (Wendt 1999 ) and the SIT in psy chology (Tafjel 1978 Hypothesis 5: Affect. If the foreign country is framed as having an identity similar to the home country, then the positive affect toward the foreign country will increase (Furia and Lucas 2006) . In addition to providing a robustness check for the identity manipulation, this hypothesis explores whether the shared sense of identity is, in part, the function of a hot affective process. While it is possible for the identity manipulation to only increase the perceived similarity between countries, it could also trigger positive affect toward the other.
To probe the robustness of the analysis, the survey included several questions that allow us to control for competing explanations that fall outside the central focus of our study. ing (Heskin and Power 1994) . Hypothesis 8 predicts that American participants are more likely to take a militarist view of international politics and therefore perceive the other as threatening (Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson 1993) . Finally, hypothesis 9 predicts that self-described "conservative" participants are more likely to view outsiders as threatening than nonconservative participants (i.e., self-described mid dle of the road or liberal; Heskin and Power 1994) . Conservatism was self-reported using a question virtually identical to that used in the American National Election
Study.
Participants and Procedure
The The ethnicity survey question indicated that the sample was 65 percent white, 20 percent Asian, 3 percent black, 3 percent Hispanic, and 9 percent "other" (or refused to answer). The participants were offered extra credit for participating in a one-hour experiment exploring the role of news coverage in international affairs.
After completing an initial survey and "distracting" sorting exercise, the partici pants were randomly assigned to one of four scenarios based on the balance of military power and the degree of shared identity between the countries. The word ing of all versions of the scenarios appears in Appendix 2. The power and identity hypotheses were tested using a 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental research design. The scenarios varied along two dichotomous dimen sions: (1) the balance of military forces (strong vs. weak); and (2) the degree of shared identity in terms of ancestry, language, and religion (shared identity vs. no shared identity). In the "strong opponent" scenario, the army and navy of the southern neighbor were described as double the size of the "home" state. In the "weak opponent" scenario, the situation was reversed.
In the shared identity sce nario, the southern neighbor was described as sharing a common language, culture, and religion. In the "different identity" scenario, the two hypothetical states did not share any similar dimensions. After reading the scenario, participants answered a short twelve-question survey. The manipulation checks in this survey indicated that only 2 of the 169 participants could not correctly identify either the balance of power between the two states or the degree of cultural similarity. While the find ings reported below include these 2 participants, the results are virtually identical if the 2 participants are deleted from the sample.
Dependent Variables
The experiment explores three dependent variables: threat perceptions, feelings of warmth, and perceptions of similarity. Results from Experiment #1
The hypotheses are tested using regression analysis with robust standard errors. Table 1 , which displays models 1, 2, and 3, presents results using the "threat per ception" dependent variable, which ranges from 0 (no threat) to 10 (extremely threatening) and has a mean of 6.6 in our sample. Hypothesis 1 predicts that if the other state is powerful, then the perception of threat should increase. The results in model 3 strongly support this realist claim; the coefficient is positive (? = 2.15; SE = 0.34) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.001 level of significance. Hypothesis 2, which predicts that a shared identity will decrease threat perception, is also supported by the data. The coefficient is negative as expected (?= -0.59; SE = 0.28) and statistically signifi cant at the better than the 0.05 level of significance. The much larger size of the power coefficient indicates that the marginal impact of the power manipulation was about four times the marginal impact of the identity manipulation. But despite this asymmetry, the analysis clearly demonstrates that both power and identity matter; realists focusing only on the material balance of power and constructivists focusing only on ideational factors miss half the story. Finally, model 3 indicates that there is no interactive impact of these variables; the interactive term is not statistically different from zero in Table 1 .
None of the remaining control variables in model 3 are statistically significant. Using Clarify software to calculate the marginal impacts, we find that a shift from no shared identity to shared identity increases the predicted probability of perceiving of identity construction at the individual level to be similar across countries. The hypothetical territorial dispute scenario was translated into Spanish, and the experi ment was administered at a Spanish university. As in the last experiment, the sce narios varied along two dimensions: the balance of military forces between the countries (strong vs. weak power) and the degree of shared identity between them (shared vs. nonshared identity). Given the absence of significant results for the con trol variables in the prior study, this experiment focused solely on the five hypoth eses tested in the first study: the power hypothesis, the identity hypothesis, the interaction hypothesis, the similarity hypothesis, and the affect hypothesis.
Participants and Procedure
The participants in experiment #2 were 112 undergraduates enrolled in a psy chology course from the University of Granada (Spain) in the spring of 2005. The participants included 46 men and 66 women. They had a median age of twenty years (range seventeen to fifty-five), and all were Caucasian. They were randomly assigned to one of four groups based on the power and identity of the framed coun try. The participants received course credit for their participation in the experiment.
The hypothetical scenario, survey questions, and dependent variables were virtually identical to experiment #1 (see Appendix 2 for minor changes made to frame iden tity in the Spanish context).
Results from Experiment #2
The results of experiment #2 appear in Table 3 . As predicted by realist theories, an unfavorable balance of power increased the perception of threat (see model 1).
The coefficient is positive (? = 2.71; SE = 0.52) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.001 level of significance. Similarly, the data strongly support the identity hypothesis proposed by constructivists. Describing the two states as having a similar culture, religion, and language significantly decreased the perception of a military threat. The estimated coefficient is negative (? = ?1.07; SE = 0.44) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.01 level of significance. As was the case in the first experiment, the balance of power has a more powerful impact than the shared identity variable. Unlike the first experiment, the interaction term, which isolates the situation in which the opposing state is strong and culturally different, produces a positive (? = 1.73; SE = 0.65) and statistically significant coefficient.
Although the addition of this interactive term slightly weakens the power and iden tity coefficients, it does not alter the conclusions we draw from the results of the regression. Thus, both power and identity influence threat perception, and the most feared states of all have both the power to injure and a different identity. As predicted by the similarity hypothesis, the identity manipulation increased the closeness of the categorization of the self and the other (see model 2). The shared identity coefficient was positive, as predicted (? = 2.37; SE = 0.51), and statistically significant at the better than the 0.001 level of significance. The marginal analysis indicates that a shift from no shared identity to shared identity increases the predicted probability of perceiving the states as similar by approxi mately 60 percentage points when holding all other variables at their means or modes (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) . Neither the power manipulation nor the interaction term produced significant changes in the assessment of similarity.
Finally, Table 3 also shows that as predicted by the affect hypothesis, the iden tity manipulation increased a sense of warmth toward the southern neighbor (see model 3). The warmth dependent variable has a mean of 50 degrees, a standard deviation of 17 degrees, and a range from 10 to 99 degrees. Describing the other state as religiously, linguistically, and culturally similar led to a statistically signifi cant increase in warmth (? = 11.29; SE = 4.31; p < 0.05). A shift from different identity to similar identity increases the sense of warmth by just over 11 degrees.
In contrast, neither the power manipulation nor the interaction term had an impact on the perception of warmth.
Experiment #3: Concrete Situation in Spain
The purpose of experiment #3 was threefold. First, we wanted to alter the power
and identity manipulations to demonstrate that a very minor difference in a framing could produce the types of dependent variable changes seen in the previous two stu dies. Therefore, the manipulation in experiment #3 begins with a very short introduc tion (approximately eighty-five words) in which shared identity and power are framed for the participants (Hiscox 2006) . This new manipulation is suitable for both a paper and pencil study (employed in the current study) and a telephone survey with a nationally representative sample (which we hope to employ in future research to demonstrate the generalizability of our findings). Moreover, we employed a real world situation rather than a hypothetical scenario to probe the robustness of pre vious findings. Critics of laboratory experiments often claim the studies lack external validity because the manipulations are abstract and devoid of real-world content (e.g., studying responses to alpha or beta state). Thus, in this experiment, we tackle Table 3 Experiment #2 Second, we investigate the interaction between identity and power in the deci sion process. Although most versions of realism and constructivism predict that only power or only identity matters, the empirical findings in the previous studies indicate both factors play a central role in threat perception. But how do these two variables interact in the decision process? Participants could simply average over two independent variables (Meyer 1981) . However, the significance of the interac tive term in the second experiment hints at a more interesting relationship. For example, participants might use a simple heuristic that privileges one dimension over the other. This type of decision-making heuristic is referred to as a "fast and frugal decision tree" (see Martignon et al. 2003) . Figure 3 , which is adapted from the work of Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999, 4) , displays a fast and frugal decision tree heuristic that privileges identity (Rousseau 2006, 217 only if a foreign country is framed as both a strong military power and diverging from democratic institutions and a market economy will the perception of threat increase.
Finally, the third experiment examines the public policy implications of the manipulations of power and identity. Although the prior two laboratory studies established the fact that shared identity decreases threat perception and military weakness increases threat perception, the experiments did not demonstrate that pub lic policy positions (e.g., trade and investment with the other) would be impacted by the assessment. Therefore, we hypothesize that if the foreign country is framed as becoming more like the home country, then individuals will be more willing to support cooperation (e.g., a trade treaty, an arms control agreement, and trade in general) with the foreign country. Thus, we test four hypotheses in this third experiment: the power hypothesis, the identity hypothesis, the revised interaction hypothesis, and the new public pol icy hypothesis.
Participants and Procedure
The participants were 112 undergraduates enrolled in psychology from the University of Granada (Spain) in the spring of 2005. The participants included 50 men and 62 women; all participants were Caucasian. Participants had a median age of twenty years (range eighteen to fifty-one). The participants, who received course credit for participating in the experiment, were randomly assigned to one of four groups based on the balance of military power and the degree of shared iden tity between the countries.
Participants completed a twenty-minute questionnaire that began with a very short paragraph (approximately eighty-five words) framing the power and collec tive identity of Russia relative to Spain and the European Union. The four introduc tory descriptions delivered at the start of the experiment are located in Appendix 3. For illustrative purposes, the condition "strong power" and "similar identity" is presented here:
We would like to ask you a few questions about relations with Russia. Many people focus on the fact that the Russians have increased defense spending by over 10% a year for the last several years. Many others believe that Russia is becoming more like the countries of the European Union due to the expanding role of markets in the econ omy and recent increases in freedom of expression and assembly for many groups in society. We are interested in your opinions.
The assignment of the order of the statements about the balance of military power and identity in the scenario was counterbalanced across participants. Given that we did not find significant differences between assignments, the results reported below are based on an analysis across assignments. Following the intro ductory scenario, participants were asked a series of questions that directly tested our hypotheses. The resulting factorial design of experiment #3 was a 2 (balance of military power: strong vs. weak power) x 2 (degree of shared identity: shared vs. nonshared identity) between-subjects design.
Dependent Variables
In the third experiment, we employ two dependent variables: threat perception and willingness to cooperate. For the statistical analysis presented below, we created a dichoto mous "favors cooperation" by combining the "strongly favors" and the "somewhat favors" categories. Table 4 Experiment #3 
Results from Experiment #3
The results from the regression analysis with the threat dependent variable are presented in Table 4 . Given that the central findings are similar with or without the interaction term, we will restrict our discussion to model 2 in Table 4 . As with the first two experiments, we once again find that an unfavorable military balance increases the perception of threat. The estimated coefficient is positive (?= 1.46; SE = 0.56) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.01 level of sig nificance. Conversely, emphasizing a shared identity between Spain and Russia decreased threat perception. The shared identity coefficient is negative (? = ?1.82; SE = 0.55) and statistically significant at the better than the 0.001 level of signifi cance. Unlike the prior two experiments, the identity variable has a larger marginal impact than the power variable in the real-world situation. Finally, model 2 indicates that the interaction between identity and power is positive (?=1.64; SE = 0.79) and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. When the other state is described as both more powerful and possessing a different identity, the perception of threat grows above and beyond simply summing the impact of the two indepen dent variables.
But how are participants using the interaction? The Interaction Hypothesis pre dicted a simple necessary condition heuristic: states would only be viewed as threa tening if they possessed both a different identity and greater military power. The 
General Discussion
Realists tend to emphasize material factors because power is viewed as the best predictor of threat (Waltz 1986, 329) , and it is relatively easy to measure (Waltz 1979, 98, 131 has about 300,000 troops and your air force has about 300 combat aircraft.
Your southern neighbor has approximately 150,000 troops and 150 combat aircraft.
(Facing strong power condition) At the time of the 1913 decision, both countries had armed forces of approximately 30,000 troops, the majority of which were stationed along the disputed territory. Since that time, the population of your southern neighbor and the size of its military have grown a lot. Currently, your army has about 150,000 troops and your air force has about 150 combat aircraft. Your southern neighbor has approximately 300,000 troops and 300 combat aircraft.
(Common to all conditions) When you arrived at the office this morning, you learned that a large-scale military clash involving hundreds of troops occurred during the previous night. Regional military authorities on both sides claim that the other country fired the first shot. Please begin the survey to explain how you will respond to this crisis.
Appendix C Introductory Paragraph from Experiment #3
(Common to all conditions) "We would like to ask you a few questions about relations with Russia. Please read the following:" (Similar identity condition) "Many people believe that Russia is becoming more like the European Union due to the expanding role of markets in the economy and recent increases in freedom of expression and assembly for many groups in society."
(Dissimilar identity condition) "Many people believe that Russia is becoming less like the European Union due to the control of the economy by govern ment bureaucrats and the tightening grip of the President over society."
(Facing strong power condition) "Many people focus on the fact that the Russians have increased defense spending by over 10% a year for the last several years."
(Facing weak power condition) "Many people focus on the fact that total Rus sian defense spending remains only about 10% of the defense spending of Spain and it NATO allies."
(Common to all conditions) "We are interested in your opinions." Note 1. We do not believe that readers should draw any important conclusions concerning the positive findings of an interaction in the Spanish experiments and the negative finding in the American experi ment. At this point in our research program, we see no reason to conclude that the process of the con struction of threat differs across countries. In the three studies reported in the article, the power variable is the most robust across all operationalizations. Sensitivity analysis using both dichotomous and tricho tomous versions of the threat dependent variables produced identical results for the power variable.
While the identity variable was similarly robust in experiments #2 and #3, it fell just short of statistical significance at the 0.05 level in experiment #1 in the sensitivity analysis. In contrast, the interaction vari able was the weakest variable in the three experiments, and it was not as robust as the identity and power variables in sensitivity analysis. Therefore, we believe more cross-national analysis is required before we can make any firm conclusions about how the process of threat construction varies across countries.
